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THE PROBLEMS OF SELF-
EXECUTION: MEDELLÍN v. TEXAS 
TARYN MARKS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On March 28, 2008, in a case that has involved an international 
tribunal’s decision,1 three habeas petitions,2 two writ petitions to the 
Supreme Court,3 a writ dismissed as improvidently granted,4 and a 
Presidential Memorandum to the Attorney General,5 the Supreme 
Court rejected a decision of the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”).6 In Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that the ICJ’s 
ruling in Avena and other Mexican Nationals7 does not have 
automatic, directly-enforceable effect in domestic courts because 
none of the treaties at issue were self-executing and because the 
President of the United States does not have the authority to 
implement the Avena judgment domestically by writing a 
memorandum to the Attorney General.8 
Because the Court so narrowly defined the holding in Medellín 
and refused to grant the power to enforce the Avena decision to 
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 1. Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
 2. Brief for Petitioner at 7, 11, 13, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984). 
To simplify citations, I will use the short form “Medellín” to refer to the Supreme Court 
decision. Any other case in which Medellín was involved will always be cited by the full case 
name. 
 3. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Medellín, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984) [hereinafter 
Petition for Certiorari I]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) 
(No. 04-5928) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari II]. 
 4. Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. at 662 (“Th[e] state court proceeding may provide 
Medellín with the very reconsideration of his Vienna Convention claim that he now seeks in the 
present proceeding. . . . [W]e dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.”). 
 5. Memorandum for the Attorney General on Compliance with the Decision of the 
International Court of Justice in Avena (Feb. 28, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html. 
 6. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1346. 
 7. Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
 8. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1363, 1371. 
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either the ICJ or to the President,9 Medellín will have little domestic 
effect. It will, however, create significant international ripples—in fact, 
it already has.10 
A. The Beginning of the End: The Legal Path to Medellín 
At its core, Medellín centers on the requirements of one Article in 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights (“Vienna Convention”): 
Article 36(1).11 Although the Vienna Convention’s requirements are 
fairly innocuous,12 Article 36(1) has been the source of increasing 
tension between the United States and the ICJ,13 particularly because 
the Supreme Court and the ICJ have reached irreconcilable 
conclusions about the Article’s meaning and its domestic 
implications.14 This divergence has only increased with time. 
The ICJ and the Supreme Court’s disagreement began when the 
Supreme Court ruled in Breard v. Greene that state procedural default 
rules bar an Article 36(1) claim if the defendant failed to raise that 
claim at trial, even if the defendant argued that the state violated a 
treaty right.15 The Court determined that, regardless of the Vienna 
 
 9. See id. at 1367 n.13 (noting that “the questions here are . . . far more limited ones”). 
 10. See Unofficial Press Release, International Court of Justice, Request for Interpretation 
of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals 
(Mexico v. United States of America), July 16, 2008, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/139/14637.pdf?PHPSESSID=75b6f75992c068e2fb48a80ddccac988. 
 11. Article 36(1) requires that a State inform a non-citizen arrested or detained within that 
State’s borders that the non-citizen has a right to inform the consulate of his own country of his 
status and to request legal aid from that consulate. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 
art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 12. Article 36(1) requires only that the arresting State inform the non-citizen of the rights 
granted by Article 36; after the State informs the non-citizen of the Vienna Convention rights, 
the non-citizen must then request that the arresting State inform the non-citizen’s consulate. Id. 
One of the main sources of contention between the United States and the ICJ has been the 
interpretation of Section 2 of the Vienna Convention. This Section allows a State to choose the 
means by which it will domestically implement the rights in Section 1 of the Vienna Convention, 
but requires that any implementation give “full effect . . . to the purposes for which the rights 
accorded under this Article are intended.” Id.; see also Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 
(1998) (per curiam) (examining the meaning of “full effect”). 
 13. See Curtis Bradley, Lori Fisher Damrosch & Martin Flaherty, Discussion, Medellín v. 
Dretke: Federalism and International Law (Feb. 21, 2005), 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 667, 
672 (2005). 
 14. Compare Breard, 523 U.S. at 375 (holding that state procedural default rules apply to 
Article 36(1) claims) with LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 497–98 (June 27) (holding that 
applying state procedural default rules to Article 36(1) claims breaches the Vienna 
Convention). 
 15. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375. Under state procedural rules, a federal habeas petitioner is 
barred from raising a claim on collateral review that the petitioner did not raise in state court or 
on direct appeal, unless the petitioner can show both cause and prejudice. See Sanchez-Llamas 
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Convention’s constitutional status, Article 36(1) rights are subject to 
the same constraints as any other domestic right16 because “the 
procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of [a] 
treaty in that State.”17 
The ICJ reached the opposite conclusion in LaGrand, in which it 
held that when the United States allowed the procedural default rule 
to prevent a defendant from asserting an Article 36(1) claim, the 
United States breached its treaty obligation to give “full effect” to 
Article 36(1) rights.18 The ICJ interpreted “full effect” to mean that 
the United States should review the merits of all Article 36(1) claims, 
regardless of any procedural problems.19 
Three years later, in Avena, the ICJ again found that the United 
States had breached its Vienna Convention treaty obligations.20 To 
remedy this breach, the ICJ ordered the United States to “review and 
reconsider” all of the cases that Mexico had identified.21 Review and 
reconsideration, according to the ICJ, “guarantees that full weight is 
given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna 
Convention.”22 The Supreme Court and the ICJ both acknowledged 
that the United States had breached its treaty obligations, but the two 
differed on the meaning of “full effect.” 
The Supreme Court specifically addressed this difference in 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.23 There, the Court held that the ICJ’s 
interpretation of “full effect,” which required the United States to 
overrule its procedural default rules, should be granted deference, but 
that the ICJ could not dictate the Court’s own interpretation of “full 
effect.”24 Procedural default rules apply the same to treaty-based 
 
v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 350, 355–57 (2006) (explaining procedural default rules and the 
rationale behind them). 
 16. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375. 
 17. Id. 
 18. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 497–98. The treaty states: “[The receiving State] must enable 
full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are 
intended.” Vienna Convention, supra note 11, 21 U.S.T. at 91, 596 U.N.T.S. at 275. 
 19. Because the brothers on whose behalf Germany brought the case were executed prior 
to the ICJ’s decision, the ICJ only generally mentioned the remedy for a breach of the treaty. 
LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 513–14; see also Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 
2004 I.C.J. 12, 59 (Mar. 31) (describing the ICJ’s decision in the LaGrand case). 
 20. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 65. 
 21. Id. at 72–73. Mexico had brought the claim on behalf of fifty-one Mexicans and 
requested a remedy for the United States’ breach of the treaty. Id. at 59. 
 22. Id. at 65. 
 23. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006). 
 24. Id. at 351. 
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claims as they do to other claims, according to the Court, first, because 
the Supreme Court, not the ICJ, ultimately interprets United States 
federal law;25 second, because ICJ decisions are not binding on even 
the ICJ beyond the particular case in question;26 third, because the 
executive branch had expressed its disagreement with the decision in 
Avena;27 and fourth, because procedural default rules are an 
important part of the United States’ domestic legal system to which 
even Constitutional rights are subject.28 
Medellín took advantage of one of these factors—that ICJ 
decisions are not binding—to slip through a loophole in the reasoning 
of Sanchez-Llamas: he argued that because he was one of the fifty-
one Mexicans named in Avena, the United States was therefore 
bound by treaty to effectuate the Avena judgment.29 
B. The Manipulations of the Medellín Case: Procedural Postures and 
Facts 
The underlying facts of Medellín are compelling and brutal but 
factored minimally within the Court’s decision. Medellín confessed in 
writing that he had participated in the gang-rape and murder of two 
teenage girls, and a Texas jury convicted him of murder during the 
commission of a sexual assault and sentenced him to death.30 After 
unsuccessfully appealing to the highest level of the state court system, 
 
 25. Id. at 353 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 26. Id. at 354. 
 27. Id. at 355. The United States withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ for 
disputes related to breaches of the Vienna Convention as a result of the decision in this case. 
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, pt. 1, chap. III, § 8, Optional 
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement 
of Disputes, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/ 
chapterIII/treaty33.asp (providing an updated list of all parties to the treaty and noting the 
United States’ withdrawal from that treaty); see also Optional Protocol to the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 (describing the obligations of signatory countries and 
the means by which countries can withdraw from the Protocol). 
 28. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 357–58. The Court also noted that allowing this broad 
interpretation of “full effect” to trump state procedural default rules could also be used to 
trump other important rules, such as the statute of limitations. Id. at 257; see also Medellín v. 
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1367 (2008) (agreeing with the Court’s view in Sanchez-Llamas that 
allowing Avena to trump state law would be “extraordinary”). 
 29. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 22. 
 30. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1354; see also Brief for Respondent at 1, Medellín, 128 S. Ct. 
(No. 06-984) (detailing the grim facts of the case). 
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including a state habeas petition,31 Medellín filed a federal habeas 
petition, which the federal district court denied.32 The district court 
also refused his request for a certificate of appealability.33 The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals denied Medellín’s appeal of the district 
court’s ruling.34 
Medellín then petitioned for, and the Supreme Court granted, 
certiorari to determine whether the United States was bound to 
reconsider the claims of the fifty-one Mexican nationals involved in 
the Avena case.35 Medellín’s case was pending before the Supreme 
Court when President Bush, in a memorandum to the Attorney 
General of the United States, ordered that “State courts [should] give 
 
 31. Medellín’s conviction was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Brief for 
Respondent, supra note 30, at 3–4, and his state petition for habeas corpus was denied in part 
because he procedurally defaulted on his Vienna Convention claim by failing to raise it at the 
trial level and in part because the court determined that he had not been prejudiced by the 
violation of his Vienna Convention right. Ex Parte Medellín, Order No. 675430-A (339th Dist. 
Ct. Jan. 22, 2001); see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 3–4 (describing Medellín’s 
procedural history). Medellín chose to return to the state court rather than appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court for certiorari. Medellín v. Cockrell, Civ. Order No. H-01-4078 (S.D. Tex. 
June 25, 2003). The District Court also denied the Vienna Convention claim because it held that 
Medellín was essentially an American citizen (although Medellín was born in Mexico and 
retained his Mexican citizenship, he lived in the United States for almost his entire life, went to 
school in the United States, and was fluent in English) and that a private individual cannot 
enforce the Vienna Convention. Ex Parte Medellín, Order No. 50,191-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 
3, 2001) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion); see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 3 
(reviewing the district court’s holding). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the 
denial. Ex Parte Medellín, Order No. 50,191-01; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 
4 (summarizing the court’s holding). 
 32. The federal district court denied the petition for substantially the same reasons as the 
state court. Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 4–5. 
 33. Medellín v. Cockrell, Civ. Order No. H-01-4078; Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, 
at 4–5. 
 34. Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004). The court held both that the Vienna 
Convention does not confer individually-enforceable rights and that the court was bound by 
Breard’s determination that Vienna Convention rights were subject to procedural default rules, 
rather than by the ICJ’s more recent, contrary decision in Avena. Id. at 279–80; see also 
Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1355 (2008) (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s decision). 
Medellín’s petition to the Fifth Circuit was pending when the ICJ decided Avena. Brief for 
Respondent, supra note 30, at 4–5. 
 35. Petition for Certiorari I, supra note 3; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 6 
(describing the issues presented in Medellín’s first petition for certiorari). The issue presented in 
Medellín was different than that presented in Sanchez-Llamas because the Court was 
considering a judgment that was binding on the United States: the ICJ had specifically ordered 
the United States to review and reconsider the cases of the fifty-one Mexicans about whom the 
case was brought, one of whom was Medellín, and thus the United States was bound by the ICJ 
Statute to review Medellín’s case. Sanchez-Llamas was not one of the Mexicans named in the 
Avena judgment and therefore the United States was not technically required to adhere to the 
ICJ’s judgment in regards to Sanchez-Llamas as it was in regards to Medellín. 
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effect to the [Avena] decision in accordance with general principles of 
comity.”36 
Citing the President’s memorandum, Medellín filed a second 
habeas petition in Texas state court.37 The Supreme Court then 
dismissed Medellín’s writ as improvidently granted, stating that the 
Texas state court could provide the review that Medellín sought and 
obviate the need for Supreme Court review.38 
Once again in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Medellín 
argued that Texas’s habeas corpus statute, which in this case required 
that the legal basis for a second habeas petition be unavailable at the 
time of the original claim,39 was satisfied by either the Avena 
judgment or the President’s memorandum.40 The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals ruled that neither could serve as a basis for the 
second appeal: the Supreme Court’s decision in Sanchez-Llamas 
established that Avena did not trump contrary state laws,41 and the 
President did not have independent authority sufficient to order the 
Texas state court to overrule its laws.42 
Medellín disagreed with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and 
so he petitioned for, and the Supreme Court again granted, certiorari 
on the issues of whether the Avena decision was binding, directly-
enforceable federal law and whether the President had the authority 
to implement the Avena decision into federal law and thus preempt 
state criminal procedural rules.43 
 
 36. Petition for Certiorari I, supra note 3, at 228. Effectively, the memorandum would have 
required that the state courts overlook the procedural default rule for the fifty-one cases at issue 
in Avena, and then consider the merits of each individual defendant's claim that the violation of 
their Vienna Convention rights had negatively affected the trial. See Avena and other Mexican 
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 57 (Mar. 31); see also Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184, 
1187–88 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (following the ICJ’s directive and reviewing Torres’s claim of 
prejudice).  
 37. Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 6. 
 38. Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666 (2005). 
 39. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(1) (2003); Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 
at 663–64; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 6, 7 (describing the Texas habeas 
statute’s requirements). 
 40. Ex Parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 330, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also Brief for 
Respondent, supra note 30, at 7 (noting Medellín’s arguments before the Texas court). 
 41. Ex Parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d at 332 (noting the consequences of holding that Article 
36 claims could overrule state procedural claims, one of which was that “‘Article 36 claims could 
trump . . . prohibitions against filing successive habeas petitions’” (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. 
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 351 (2006))). 
 42. Ex Parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d at 342. 
 43. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008). 
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II.  THE OPINIONS 
A. Majority Rules: The Court’s Opinion 
1. The Direct Effect of Avena 
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, held that Avena 
was not automatically enforceable domestic federal law. In doing so, 
the Court not only rejected Medellín’s argument that the treaties that 
obligate the United States to abide by the decisions of the ICJ are 
self-executing, but also rejected Medellín’s subsequent argument that 
any ICJ judgment issued according to those treaties must also be self-
executing.44 
Whether the treaties that Medellín identified were self-executing 
was thus central to the case and formed a substantial part of the 
Court’s opinion. The Court therefore needed to define “self-
executing” and to formulate a test for determining whether a treaty is 
self-executing. In a footnote, the Court laid out (though did not 
adopt) one definition: a self-executing treaty is one that “has 
automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification.”45 To 
determine whether a treaty has automatic domestic effect, the Court 
examined the treaty’s text, negotiation history, and post-ratification 
understandings.46 
The foundation of the Court’s main argument—that ICJ 
judgments are not automatically domestically binding—was the text 
of the treaties Medellín identified. The Court found that none of these 
treaties (the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, the United 
Nations Charter, and the ICJ Statute) were self-executing. 
The first treaty, the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, 
offers just a “bare grant of jurisdiction,” as it requires only that 
 
 44. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 20–22. Medellín relied on the Optional Protocol to 
the Vienna Convention, the United Nations Charter, and the ICJ Statute. Id.; see also Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 2, at 19–20 (arguing that these three treaties obligated the United States 
to adhere to the Avena judgment). Congress had not passed any implementing legislation for 
any of these treaties. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357. 
 45. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1356 n.2. The Court did not explicitly adopt this definition, but 
noted that an alternative construction would be that a self-executing treaty grants directly 
enforceable individual rights. Id. at 1357; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–31, 
Medellín, 128 S. Ct. (No. 06-984) (discussing the varied definitions of self-executing). 
 46. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357. 
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signatory nations submit disputes to the ICJ.47 It does not also require 
that signatory nations enforce ICJ judgments.48 
Rather, the power to enforce ICJ decisions stems from Article 
94(1) of the United Nations Charter, which requires that States 
“undertake[] to comply” with any ICJ decision.49 The Court, however, 
held that Article 94(1) lacks mandatory language and so interpreted 
the Article as a non-self-executing, solely contractual commitment.50 
Because the United States can veto any attempt to enforce an ICJ 
judgment under Article 94(1), the United States feasibly could never 
be bound by any judgment,51 so the Court refused to hold that the 
United Nations Charter was self-executing.52 A holding that the 
Charter was self-executing would require the Court to adopt the 
incongruous position that the United States would always be bound at 
the domestic level by an ICJ judgment, but might never be bound at 
the international level.53 Common understanding at the time the 
Charter was ratified bolstered the Court’s conclusion: a country 
always had the option to choose not to comply with a judgment of the 
ICJ for political or diplomatic reasons. Automatic domestic 
enforcement would nullify that option.54 These two reasons combined 
led the Court to hold that the United Nations Charter is not self-
executing. 
Nor is the ICJ Statute55: the Statute does not provide the requisite 
authority to force a United States’ court to obey an ICJ decision.56 
First, an ICJ decision binds only the parties involved and only as to 
that specific decision; and second, only states can be parties to cases in 
 
 47. Id. at 1358. 
 48. Id. 
 49. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1. 
 50. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1358–59. The Government had intervened in the case to argue 
the Presidential Power Memorandum, but had only submitted an amicus brief arguing against 
the domestic effect of ICJ decisions. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Medellín, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-946) [hereinafter Brief for the United 
States]. 
 51. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1359. Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council 
must first decide to enforce a judgment and then issue a resolution to that effect; the United 
States, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has a veto power over any such 
resolution. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. 
 52. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1360. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1359. 
 55. The ICJ Statute establishes the basic structure and procedures of the ICJ. Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (1945). See also Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 
1353–54 (describing the ICJ and the ICJ Statute). 
 56. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1360. 
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the ICJ, so Medellín was not a party to Avena and therefore cannot 
individually enforce the Avena decision.57 This is true even if the case 
is brought by a State on behalf of an individual (as Mexico did in 
Avena).58 Thus, the ICJ Statute is non-self-executing and cannot be 
used as a source of authority to directly enforce ICJ judgments in 
domestic courts. 
Finally, the Executive Branch’s consistent position that the treaties 
at issue are not self-executing also factored into the Court’s 
determination because of the weight given to the Executive Branch 
on issues related to foreign affairs.59 Based on the language of the 
treaties at issue, their ratification history, and Executive Branch policy, 
the Court held that ICJ judgments are not self-executing. 
The Court then defended the test used to determine whether the 
treaties were self-executing and attacked the dissent’s analysis.60 The 
Court argued that it should utilize a blanket analysis—focused on the 
text of the treaty and congressional understanding of the treaty’s 
meaning at the time of its ratification—that could be applied to any 
treaty.61 Such an analysis not only followed precedent, but also 
recognized the careful procedure established by the United States 
Constitution’s Framers.62 In contrast, according to the majority, the 
dissent’s analysis ignored the treaty’s text and relied instead on a 
context-specific test that could make certain parts of a treaty self-
executing, and other parts non-self-executing.63 The Court feared that 
if the dissent’s test were used, legislative power would shift from 
Congress to the judiciary64: a judge’s ad-hoc decision, rather than the 
congressionally-approved language of a treaty, would determine 
whether a treaty was self-executing. 
Next, the Court supported its conclusion with post-ratification 
understandings of the treaties at issue, general interpretive principles, 
and the consequences of holding that ICJ judgments are 
automatically binding.65 Within these bolstering arguments, however, 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1361. 
 60. Id. at 1362. 
 61. Id. at 1361–62. 
 62. Id. at 1362. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1363–65. Of particular importance to the Court was that no other nation grants 
automatic domestic enforcement to a decision by the ICJ. Id. at 1363. 
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the Court was careful to specify that its holding applied only to ICJ 
judgments and only to the treaties considered—it was not a 
categorical determination that any judgment by an international 
tribunal is non-self-executing.66 It also was not a categorical denial of 
all enforcement mechanisms—the Court noted that this specific 
judgment could still be enforced using political and diplomatic 
pressure, congressional action, and even a determination that the 
Vienna Convention itself is self-executing.67 But, the Court held, the 
Avena judgment does not have automatic domestic effect by itself. 
Because of this determination, the Court then needed to determine 
whether the President could create that domestic effect with a 
memorandum to the Attorney General. 
2. The President and his Memorandum 
To analyze the exercise of government power, the Court began by 
considering whether the President had the authority to unilaterally 
implement the Avena decision.68 Relying on the analysis of executive 
power in Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube v. Sawyer, the Court determined that the President does not.69 
The United States intervened in the case to argue that the 
Presidential Memorandum constituted binding domestic law. The 
Government began by asserting that the President was within the first 
Youngstown category and therefore that there was a presumption that 
the President had the requisite authority to create domestic law.70 
 
 66. Id. at 1365 (“Our holding does not call into question the ordinary enforcement of 
foreign judgments or international arbitral agreements.”). 
 67. Id. at 1365–67. The Court has never addressed whether the Vienna Convention is self-
executing, instead, it has always assumed that the Vienna Convention does grant directly-
enforceable individual rights. Id. at 1357. 
 68. Id. at 1368. 
 69. Id. at 1371 (“[T]he Executive cannot unilaterally execute a non-self-executing treaty by 
giving it domestic effect.”); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635, 
637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing an analysis of presidential power). 
 70. Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 10–11; see also Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1368 
(noting the United States’ argument). Under the first category, the President is acting with 
maximum executive power, as he has both the power inherent to his position and any power 
that Congress has granted to him; there is a strong presumption that any presidential act under 
this category is permissible. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635. Under the second category, the 
President is acting in a “zone of twilight;” although he is acting only with the power inherent to 
his position, Congress has neither approved nor disapproved of his action, and thus 
congressional inaction can imply that a presidential act is permissible. Id. at 637. Under the third 
category, the President is acting at the “lowest ebb” of his power, as Congress has disapproved 
of his action, and so the President is acting only with “his own constitutional powers minus any 
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Because the Optional Protocol and the United Nations Charter were 
duly-ratified treaties, these two treaties implicitly authorized the 
President to implement obligations under these treaties.71 The 
Medellín Court responded that the Senate approves and the President 
signs a non-self-executing treaty on the understanding that the treaty 
is not domestic law and cannot be transformed into domestic law 
without further congressional action.72 This understanding does not 
grant to the President the power to unilaterally implement such 
treaties, it “implicitly prohibits him from doing so.”73 Despite the 
President’s ability to quickly—and perhaps with a better 
understanding of the sensitive foreign policy issues at play74—
determine whether an ICJ judgment should be enforced, the Court 
held that, under balance of powers, only Congress can implement a 
treaty.75 
The Court then dismissed the United States’ arguments that 
“Congress has expressly authorized the President to direct all 
functions connected with the United States’ participation in the 
United Nations”76 and that the President’s “authoritative role in 
litigation implicating foreign affairs”77 provides the power necessary 
for the President to unilaterally implement a treaty.78 Although the 
Court noted that the President has ample authority to ensure that the 
United States adheres to its international obligations,79 the President’s 
authority does not extend to creating domestic law.80 
The United States also argued that a long line of cases that 
acknowledged the President’s power to resolve foreign disputes 
should be interpreted as imputing to him the necessary authority to 
 
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter,” and thus any action that he takes must be 
carefully analyzed. Id. at 637–38. 
 71. Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 10–11; see also Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1368 
(noting the United States’ argument). 
 72. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1369; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 14 
(“[U]nless the text of the treaty reflects an agreement between the President and the Senate to 
create domestic law, no such law is made.”). 
 73. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1369. 
 74. See Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 11–12 (arguing that “[t]he President is 
in the best position to make a determination on those issues” and noting “his ability to respond 
expeditiously” to “sensitive foreign policy issues implicated by an ICJ decision”). 
 75. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1369–70. 
 76. Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 16 (citing 22 U.S.C. 287, 287a). 
 77. Id. at 18. 
 78. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1371. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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enforce ICJ judgments.81 Rejecting the United States’ argument, the 
Court narrowly defined the authority in those cases as the authority 
to make “executive agreements to settle civil claims between 
American citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals,”82 
and noted the differences between that authority and the power to 
create domestic law.83 The United States’ acknowledgement that the 
memorandum was “unprecedented”84 only bolstered the Court’s 
holding.85 
Thus, the Court concluded that the Avena decision does not have 
automatically-binding domestic effect and that the President does not 
have the authority to unilaterally transform an ICJ judgment into 
binding domestic law. 
B. The Test for Self-Execution and the Problem with Texas’s 
Decision: Justice Stevens’s Concurrence 
Justice Stevens’s concurrence began by acknowledging the 
wisdom of the dissent’s argument,86 establishing a tone throughout his 
opinion that resonated more like a dissent than a concurrence. 
Though he was unwilling to go as far as the dissent in holding that the 
treaties at issue in this case are self-executing,87 Justice Stevens 
strongly objected to the majority’s implicit presumption against self-
execution.88 Despite his objection, Justice Stevens analyzed the 
treaties under a rubric that was substantially similar to the majority’s 
reasoning.89 He cautioned that under his analysis, the case 
“present[ed] a closer question than the Court’s opinion allow[ed],”90 
 
 81. Id.; see also Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 12–13 (arguing that, according 
to the Court’s precedent, the President has the power to unilaterally implement treaties). 
 82. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1371. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 29–30, 
Bustillo v. Johnson & Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (Nos. 05-51 & 04-10566). 
 85. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1372. The Court also briefly considered Medellín’s argument that 
the President’s “Take Care” powers under the Constitution (the President should “take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. CONST., art II, § 3) provide sufficient authority for 
the memorandum to be enforceable. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 30–31. Because the 
Take Care powers revolve around executing laws rather than making them, the Court quickly 
rejected this argument based on its previous determination that the judgment is not domestic 
law, and that the President cannot execute something that it not law. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 
1372. 
 86. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1372 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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but he ultimately agreed with the majority’s determination that both 
the treaties and the Avena judgment are non-self-executing. 
Justice Stevens also agreed with the majority’s holding that the 
President cannot unilaterally implement a non-self-executing treaty,91 
but expressed a greater concern than the majority regarding the 
United States’ general international obligation to adhere to treaties to 
which the United States is a party.92 Justice Stevens also pointed out 
that because of the federalist structure of the United States’ legal 
system, the burden of the obligation to adhere to the United States’ 
international commitments fell on the Texas state courts; the Texas 
state courts’ refusal to adhere to that obligation caused the case to 
progress this far and create such international strife.93 Texas could 
have eased the international pressure surrounding the Medellín 
decision by choosing to follow the Avena decision.94 
C. The Dissent’s Seven Factors for Self-Execution 
In a dissent joined by Justices Souter and Ginsberg, Justice Breyer 
argued that the majority was too concerned with the treaty’s text 
rather than with the means by which the United States implements 
treaties.95 According to the dissent, the majority should have 
formulated its test from the long line of cases in which the Court had 
found that a treaty was self-executing.96 
The dissent first asserted that considering just treaty language is 
insufficient.97 Treaty language cannot reflect the vast differences 
between nations’ legal systems; therefore, each domestic system must 
be the starting point for treaty interpretation.98 Looking at the Court’s 
precedent, the dissent argued that the Court had historically found a 
wide variety of treaties to be self-executing99 and had relied on much 
 
 91. Id. at 1374. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1374–75 (pointing out that the Oklahoma judiciary had already accepted the 
decision of the ICJ and had reviewed the claims of one of the Avena nationals in its courts). 
 94. Id. at 1375. Texas eventually chose not to comply with the ICJ’s judgment, and 
executed Medellín on August 5, 2008, without having given him the review and reconsideration 
demanded by the Avena opinion, Allan Turner & Rosanna Ruiz, Medellín Executed for Rape, 
Murder of Houston Teens, HOUS. CHRON. Aug. 6, 2008, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ 
metropolitan/5924476.html. 
 95. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1377 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1378–80. 
 99. Id. 
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more than the “textual clarity” that the majority required.100 From this 
precedent, the dissent formulated a seven-factor test for self-
execution.101 
First, the relevant treaties—the Optional Protocol and the United 
Nations Charter—are self-executing, according to the dissent,102 
because they contain mandatory, binding language, which the Court 
had previously found determinant when considering whether a treaty 
is self-executing.103 The dissent countered the majority’s argument 
regarding the enforcement provision of the United Nations Charter 
by arguing that Article 94(1) is reserved for when a country chooses 
not to comply with a binding ICJ judgment, and thus that it should not 
dictate the procedural method used when a country chooses to 
comply with an ICJ judgment.104 
Second, the dissent viewed the Vienna Convention itself as self-
executing and the provision at issue as judicially-enforceable.105 This 
led directly to the dissent’s third factor: that it would be incongruous 
for a judgment made binding by a self-executing treaty to not also be 
self-executing.106 The dissenters interpreted Sanchez-Llamas to hold 
only that state procedural rules cannot be overridden by the Vienna 
Convention.107 Because of this interpretation, they were able to argue 
that the Avena judgment, as a binding ICJ judgment that specifically 
dictated that the United States override state procedural rules, is 
sufficiently different from a general treaty obligation, that Sanchez-
Llamas does not control.108 
Fourth, the majority’s holding could result in negative practical 
implications. For example, there are numerous other treaties in which 
the United States has submitted to the jurisdiction of the ICJ to 
resolve disputes related to those treaties; it would be unrealistic to 
 
 100. Id. at 1381. The dissent later noted that by seeking textual clarity with regard to 
whether a treaty is self-executing, the majority was “[h]unting for what the text cannot contain.” 
Id. at 1389. 
 101. Id. at 1383. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. The dissent relied on the term “compulsory jurisdiction” and a dictionary-based 
definition of “undertake to comply” to interpret the U.N. Charter’s requirement as a present-
tense, mandatory obligation. Id. at 1384–85. 
 104. Id. at 1385. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1386. 
 107.  Id. 
 108. Id. 
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expect Congress to implement all of those ICJ judgments in order to 
resolve those disputes.109 
Fifth, the remedy required by the ICJ—review and 
reconsideration of the judgments—is one that is clearly within the 
domain of the judiciary.110 
Sixth, domestically enforcing the Avena judgment would not 
create a constitutional conflict.111 
And seventh, neither the President nor Congress spoke against 
making this judgment automatically domestically enforceable.112 For 
the dissent, the combination of these seven factors meant that the 
Avena judgment is self-executing and directly enforceable.113 
Because the dissent found that the Avena judgment is directly 
enforceable, it then had to interpret the judgment and determine what 
“review and reconsideration” would require.114 Several elements 
convinced the dissent that the case should have been remanded back 
to the Texas state courts to apply the Avena judgment: remand is the 
usual procedural step here; this case was focused in the Texas state 
courts, which would allow for post-conviction proceedings if Medellín 
could assert a claim that was unavailable at the time of trial;115 and the 
President specifically directed the cases at issue in Avena back to the 
state courts.116 
The dissent lastly stated that, contrary to the majority, it would 
proceed more carefully before asserting that the President can never 
override state law without congressional approval117: “silence . . . 
cannot be taken as agreement with the majority’s decision.”118 The 
dissent concluded by noting that it was particularly concerned with 
the failure of the United States to uphold its international legal 
obligations.119 
 
 109. Id. at 1387–88. 
 110. Id. at 1388. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1389. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1389–90. See also Memorandum for the Attorney General on Compliance with 
the Decision of the International Court of Justice in Avena (Feb. 28, 2005), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html (dictating that the courts 
rehear the cases at issue in Avena). 
 117. Id. at 1390–91. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1391–92. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/18/2009  4:25:05 PM 
206 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:191 
III.  A HOLLOW VICTORY: MEDELLÍN’S IMPLICATIONS 
At their core, the holdings in this case are simple answers to the 
questions presented: the Avena decision is not binding federal law just 
because the United States has an international obligation to abide by 
ICJ decisions;120 and the President does not have the executive 
authority to implement the Avena decision domestically and thus 
overrule state laws.121 These holdings by themselves are neither 
monumental nor unexpected.122 Rather, the implications of the 
Medellín decision, and the Court’s implicit assertions within it, will 
impact both the legal field surrounding the domestic implementation 
of treaties and the United States’ international reputation, 
particularly in regards to the ICJ and the binding nature of its 
judgments. 
The implications of the Court’s analysis are fourfold, the most 
important of these implications being that related to self-executing 
treaties. First, the Court established an implicit presumption that all 
treaties are non-self-executing,123 delineated a test for finding a treaty 
to be self-executing,124 and placed the determination as to whether a 
treaty is non-self-executing firmly with the judiciary.125 Second, there is 
the implication of the Court’s continuing assumption that the Vienna 
Convention creates judicially-enforceable individual rights.126 Third, 
the Court’s decision did little to change the actual balance of power 
between the Court and the Executive,127 and it left lingering questions 
regarding the President’s role in determining whether the United 
States should adhere to its international obligations and how to 
implement those presidential determinations. Finally, the decision 
 
 120. Id. at 1361, 1363, 1365 (majority opinion). Note, however, that the Court’s conclusion 
rests only on a consideration of the treaties that Medellín identified. Id. at 1364–65. 
 121. Id. at 1372 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 122. Kent Scheidegger, Medellín: What Would Congressional Implementation of Avena 
Look Like?, CRIME AND CONSEQUENCES, Mar. 27, 2008, 
http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/2008/03/medellin_what_would_congressio_1.html; see 
also Ernie Young, Medellín v. Texas: Another Set of Early Thoughts, Mar. 25, 2008, 
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1206477292.shtml (noting that the Court’s holdings were 
unsurprising). 
 123. See infra notes 128, 129. 
 124. See infra Part III.B. 
 125. See infra Part III.C. 
 126. See infra Part III.A. 
 127. See Lyle Denniston, States win Over President on Criminal Law Issue, SCOTUS BLOG, 
Mar. 25, 2008, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/states-win-over-president-on-criminal-law-issue/ 
(asserting that the Court struck a heavy blow to the President). 
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could also have several important international ramifications for the 
United States. 
A. Non-Self-Execution: Presumptions 
The most important aspect of this case is its implicit presumption 
that all treaties are non-self-executing. Though the Court does not 
explicitly state as such, its decision clearly indicates acceptance of that 
presumption,128 and both the concurrence and the dissent identify and 
express their disagreement with it.129 Barring an explicit statement 
that the treaty is self-executing either in the treaty or during the 
ratification process, under Medellín’s holding, all treaties are 
presumed to be non-self-executing.130 
This presumption will impact the United States’ international 
actions to a greater extent than it will the United States’ domestic 
actions,131 in part because it is effectively what the United States 
already does domestically. Domestically, the presumption creates a 
two-step process in which the United States government must first 
ratify a treaty according to the United States Constitution,132 and then, 
if necessary, implement any rights granted by that treaty via the 
legislative branch.133 The Senate already frequently attaches 
reservations to treaties that state that the United States views the 
treaty as non-self-executing;134 the Court’s decision simply affirmed 
the legality of this process. Most treaties also operate only at the 
 
 128. See, e.g., Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 (“[O]nly ‘[i]f the treaty contains stipulations which 
are self-executing . . . [will] they have the force and effect of a legislative enactment.’” (quoting 
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)) (alterations in original)); id. at 1363–64 (“[O]ne 
would expect the ratifying parties to . . . have clearly stated their intent to give those judgments 
domestic effect . . . .”); id. at 1364 (holding that “treaties [are] self-executing when the textual 
provisions indicate that the President and the Senate intended for the agreement to have 
domestic effect.”). 
 129. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1372 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1380 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 1363–64 (majority opinion). 
 131. Treaties become binding immediately upon ratification on the international plane, 
regardless of the domestic steps that a country may be required to take before its government 
could adhere to those obligations. BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 
2003). 
 132. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 133. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1366. 
 134. CARTER ET AL., supra note 131; see also Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1373 n.2 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (citing to a treaty with a reservation making certain clauses non-
self-executing). 
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international level and thus have little direct domestic impact, 
regardless of whether they are self-executing.135 
The one area in which this presumption could impact the domestic 
actions of the United States would be those treaties, such as human 
rights treaties, that purport to grant rights to individuals.136 With a 
presumption against self-execution, a United States citizen would be 
required to wait until Congress implemented a treaty before any of 
the individual rights granted in that treaty would legally attach to that 
citizen at a domestic level.137 The Article 36(1) rights at issue in 
Medellín exemplify the potential impact of a presumption against self-
execution: the Fifth Circuit found that Article 36(1) was not 
individually domestically enforceable and used that determination as 
an alternate means of denying Medellín the review he sought.138 
B. Non-Self-Execution: A New Test 
The Court also did little to quash the confusion surrounding self-
execution, its definition, and the test that should be used to determine 
whether a treaty is self-executing.139 
Although the Court did not adopt a definition for self-execution, 
it did delineate a definition that it would use for the purposes of the 
case here.140 The Court’s definition of self-execution, noted in a 
footnote, is a treaty that “has automatic domestic effect as federal law 
upon ratification.”141 Key to this definition is what it does not 
include—direct effect. The term “self-execution” has been used 
interchangeably with “direct effect,”142 something that the Court 
 
 135. CARTER, ET AL., supra note 131. 
 136. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, S. EXEC. DOC. D, 95-2 (1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 137. Additionally, because of the Court’s delineation between self-execution and direct 
enforcement, a United States citizen would also have to wait until Congress created a judicially-
enforceable cause of action. 
 138. Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004). Note, however, that the ICJ has 
ruled that Article 36(1) does confer individually-enforceable rights. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 
2001 I.C.J. (June 27). 
 139. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357. 
 140. Id. at 1356 n.2. 
 141. Id. Of course, the Court’s implicit presumption is that treaties are non-self-executing 
and thus that they will not have this automatic domestic effect. 
 142. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 30–31 (“[S]elf-executing is one of 
those words that people use to cover a lot of different meanings . . . . [T]here’s another meaning 
of ‘self-executing,’ or maybe it’s a misuse of the term . . . .” (statement of Solicitor General Paul 
Clement)). Direct effect means that the treaty confers on an individual the right to enforce the 
treaty in domestic courts—i.e., that the treaty itself creates a cause of action in a court of law. 
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ignored. Under the Court’s carefully-worded definition of self-
execution, the treaty itself would not serve to create a cause of action 
for a violation of any treaty rights, and would, in essence, be judicially 
unenforceable until Congress chose to make it enforceable.143 
The Court also implicitly established a new test for self-
execution,144 but this will likely only further confuse the legal issues 
surrounding self-execution and its definition. This confusion results in 
part because the majority did not explicitly acknowledge that it was 
establishing a new test, and in part because the test that the majority 
chose was one of the principal sources of contention between the 
dissent and the majority.145 Both the majority and the dissent pointed 
to cases in which its test was utilized, and then faulted the other’s 
analysis.146 By failing to explicitly adopt (or even to acknowledge) a 
new test for self-execution, the Court left lower courts with a choice 
between adopting the majority’s test, relying on previous tests,147 or 
using the dissent’s test.148 Although the reasons for the Court’s refusal 
to explicitly adopt either a definition or a test are significant,149 the 
continued lack of clarity only further confuses the issue. 
Because the Court did little to change the manner in which 
treaties are already viewed, and maintained the confusion 
surrounding self-execution, the Court’s definition and test of self-
execution will have little domestic impact. 
 
 143. A self-executing treaty would require that the United States adhere to the obligations 
within that treaty. Direct effect would mean that an individual citizen could enforce that 
obligation in a court. For example, if Article 36(1) were self-executing, police would be 
required, as a matter of domestic law, to inform non-citizens of their right to have their consul 
informed of their arrest. But only if Article 36(1) were also found to have direct effect could an 
individual sue a police officer for failing to inform the individual of that right. 
 144. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1361–62. 
 145. See id. at 1373 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Although Justice Stevens 
agreed with the majority that the provisions at issue were not self-executing, he did so by relying 
on the language of the treaties. 
 146. See, e.g., id. at 1361–62 (majority opinion); id. at 1377 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 147. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 31 (noting that self-execution has 
been defined as direct effect). 
 148. See supra Part II.C (describing the dissent’s test). 
 149. The reasons were: that it will pin the Court to a definition it is not ready to adopt, that 
few other countries even consider allowing a treaty to be self-executing, and that treaties 
involve sensitive issues in which a flexible definition and test may be preferable. Medellín, 128 S. 
Ct. at 1356 n.2, 1363 (majority opinion). 
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C. Non-Self Execution: A Judicial Determination 
The Court’s decision did, however, clearly place the power to 
determine whether a judgment is self-executing with the judiciary, not 
with Congress, which also served as another point of contention 
between the dissent and the majority.150 The judiciary would, under the 
majority’s test, examine the text and ratification history of the treaty 
to determine whether it was self-executing;151 logically, then, Congress 
itself could dictate whether a treaty was self-executing merely by 
indicating its opinion regarding self-execution during the treaty 
drafting and ratification process. According to the dissent, however, 
the Court’s opaque definition of self-execution could easily make a 
determination as to whether a treaty was self-executing unworkable if 
Congress, although it intended for a treaty to be self-executing, did 
not use the appropriate language.152 The dissent’s seven-factor test 
would serve to quell this potential problem, as it would rely on more 
than Congress inserting the magic self-executing words.153 
D. Direct Effect: The Vienna Convention 
An additional impact of the Court’s decision is the continued 
assumption that the rights granted by the Vienna Convention are 
individually judicially-enforceable.154 The Court has never ruled on 
this issue, but has always assumed that the treaty creates a cause of 
action that the judiciary can enforce.155 This case further solidifies that 
assumption within the Court’s jurisprudence, and will make it 
increasingly harder for the Court to rule that Vienna Convention 
rights are not directly enforceable. 
E. The Balance of Power 
The impact of Medellín on executive power and the balance of 
power between the Executive and the judiciary is fairly limited. 
Although the decision could be read as one in which the Court, by 
denying the Executive the ability to unilaterally implement a foreign 
judgment, asserted its power over the Executive, the actual holding is 
 
 150. See, e.g., id. at 1362. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1388 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1357 n.4 (majority opinion). 
 155. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 343 (2006); Breard v. Greene, 523 
U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam). 
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quite narrow. In a footnote, the majority limited the impact of its 
decision to bind only cases that share almost the exact same 
circumstances: the President attempting to create federal law by 
himself based on the judgment of an international tribunal that was 
established by and is operating under non-self-executing treaties.156 
In light of the footnote, the case does little to change the current 
balance of power between the courts and the President. Indeed, the 
Court may have been confined in its ability to rule otherwise: the 
Government made clear that although it disagreed with the decision 
in Avena, it wanted to enforce the judgment for diplomatic reasons, 
not because of any intrinsic belief in ICJ decisions, or even in the ICJ 
itself.157 It would have been inconsistent for the Court to grant the 
President the power to domestically implement the judgment of an 
international court when the President clearly did not believe that the 
international court should have any domestic power. 
The Court also chose to ignore several additional questions 
related to the President’s memorandum. The informal nature of the 
memorandum was not addressed, only the President’s authority to 
implement domestic law.158 The implicit assumption is that had he 
been able to implement the Avena judgment, his memorandum would 
have been sufficient. This assumption presents enormous implications 
regarding what the President would be required to do (or not to do) 
to implement treaties into domestic law. The nature of the President’s 
memorandum is not something that figured prominently in the case, 
but is an interesting sidenote about the procedural formality that 
would be required if the President did have the power to implement 
treaties into domestic law. 
A final area in which the balance of power may have shifted 
concerns the President’s ability to decide whether to comply with a 
decision by the ICJ. Given the United States’ emphatic assertion that 
the President alone should decide whether to comply with ICJ 
decisions,159 the Court’s decision, which effectively placed that 
determination with the judiciary, could serve as a potential source of 
contention between the President and the Court. 
 
 156. Medellín, 128 S. Ct at 1367 n.13. 
 157. See Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 4. The United States’ decision to pull 
out of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction for disputes related to Vienna Convention claims 
provides evidence of this lack of faith in ICJ decisions. 
 158. See Ex Parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
 159. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1367. 
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F. The United States and the Rest of the World 
This decision will do little to help the increasingly negative world 
opinion of the United States and its ability to adhere to its 
international obligations.160 The fight over the interpretation and 
domestic implementation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention has 
caused a great deal of strife between the United States and Mexico, as 
well as between the United States and the ICJ. Mexico filed an 
additional petition in the ICJ in response to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in this case, requesting that the ICJ define “review and 
reconsideration” and take steps to prevent the execution of any 
Mexican national involved in the Avena decision.161 The request 
essentially confirms that appropriate review and reconsideration, 
particularly for Medellín, did not occur and that Medellín’s execution 
placed the United States in breach of the Vienna Convention.162 
Regardless of this breach, the United States must defend the Court’s 
decision that the Avena judgment is not directly binding on state 
courts because it is a Supreme Court decision; and the United States 
must also defend Texas’s decision to execute Medellín because of 
federalism. This is a tenuous position at best. 
The limited domestic implications of the case could be changed by 
the international ramifications of the decision. Mexico is fighting the 
United States at every turn in the ICJ, and the United States’ clear 
dismissal of ICJ judgments is creating further tension both between 
the United States and Mexico and between the United States and the 
ICJ.163 The United States is in breach of its treaty obligations 
according to the judgment of the tribunal established to interpret 
those treaties, the ICJ.164 The House of Representatives recently 
proposed a bill to implement the Avena decision in response to the 
 
 160. E.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Introductory Note to Bush Memorandum on Avena and U.S. 
Supreme Court Decisions in Medellín, 44 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 961, 961 (2005). 
 161. Request for the Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case 
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Request 
for the Indication of Provisional Measures, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/ 
14639.pdf?PHPSESSID=f33ed999d48709f6524e7df37a6de6dc, p. 4–5. The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals set the date of Medellín’s execution as August 5, 2008, and the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals denied a stay of execution, Ex Parte Medellín, Order No.WR-50191-03 (Tex. 
Crim. App. July 31, 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished order), as did the United State Supreme 
Court, Medellín v. Texas, 2008 WL 3821478 (Aug. 5, 2008).  
 162. Unofficial Press Release, supra note 10, at 12. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 16–24; see also supra note 55. 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín;165 the House’s action, however, 
did not influence Texas’s decision to execute Medellín, and Texas’s 
decision only created further tension between the United States and 
Mexico. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court ruled that the Avena judgment was non-self-
executing and that the President did not have the unilateral power to 
enforce the Avena judgment domestically. The Court’s ruling had little 
domestic impact. The international impact, however, was much more 
significant. This difference elucidates quite nicely the affect that the 
Medellín v. Texas decision will have on the United States and on the 
international community: the United States will continue to enforce 
treaties domestically in the same way it has always done, often 
irrespective of the international community’s unfavorable opinion, 
and the international community will continue its rumblings against 





 165. H.R. 6481 (110th, 2nd session, introduced July 14, 2008). 
